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Throughout the 1990’s the republics of the Former 
Yugoslavia fought a civil war resulting in the worst 
atrocities seen on European soil since World War II.  The 
international community stood idly by while combatants in 
Slovenia and, especially, Croatia used techniques such as 
concentration camps, torture, rape, and murder to attain 
their goals of “ethnically pure” societies.  Despite 
intervening in the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 
1992-1995 and in Kosovo from 1998-1999, thousands suffered 
on an even greater scale than before. 
When the republic of Montenegro, still under the 
oppressive rule of Yugoslav President Slobodan Miloševic, 
began making moves towards independence, again the 
international community decided that inaction was not an 
option.  With significant arbitration led by the European 
Union, Serbia and Montenegro peacefully agreed to forming a 
loose union and delaying any efforts to create independent 
states.  It is critical to understand why intervention 
worked in this case and not in the previous attempts with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.  Believing that 
international actors can affect state behavior without 
considering other factors can result in faulty policy 
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A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
With the collapse of communism in the early 1990’s the 
world was braced for peace.  One by one the former 
republics of the Soviet Union and its satellite states in 
Eastern Europe felt as if a great burden had been lifted.   
Yet as these nations were beginning to enjoy their newly 
found freedom, Yugoslavia was spiraling into chaos.  In the 
end, the world was witness to a civil war resulting in the 
worst atrocities seen on European soil since World War II.  
The international community stood idly by while combatants 
in Slovenia and, especially, Croatia used techniques such 
as concentration camps, torture, rape, and murder to attain 
their goals of “ethnically pure” societies.  The conflicts 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992-1995 and in Kosovo from 
1998-1999 differed from their predecessors as the world 
community attempted to stave off bloodshed by intervening.  
Despite this, thousands still suffered on an even greater 
scale than before.  When the republic of Montenegro, still 
under the oppressive rule of Yugoslav President Slobodan 
Miloševic, began making moves towards independence, again 
the international community decided to intercede.  With 
heavy international arbitration, Serbia and Montenegro 
peacefully agreed to forming a loose union and delaying any 
efforts to create independent states.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to understand if external actors were the 
proximate cause behind Montenegro’s decision to abandon its 
drive for independence.  It is critical to understand why 
intervention worked in this case and not in the previous 
attempts with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.  Believing 
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that international actors can affect state behavior without 
considering other factors can result in faulty policy 
decisions and not achieve the desired outcomes. 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
The central question of my thesis is “Is the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro a case of successful international 
intervention?”  The international community, in particular 
the European Union, is quick to congratulate itself for 
averting another bloody Balkan conflict in Montenegro.  I 
argue that it was not simply a matter of diligence on their 
part, but that there are certain other factors that 
affected their ability to succeed.  Another important 
question is what was the role of nationalism on 
Montenegro’s decision to remain unified with Serbia?  Would 
the international community have been able to hold the 
union together if nationalists desired otherwise?  Finally, 
I examine the role of material interests of Montenegro’s 
political leaders, business leaders, and lobby groups.  If 
the interests of these entities favored independence, could 
they have achieved their goal regardless of what the 
international community preferred?  Answering these 
questions is critical to understanding whether it was the 
involvement of external actors resulting in the successful 
union of Serbia and Montenegro or if nationalism and 
material interests had a role in the process as well. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
I begin by analyzing the presence and effect of 
nationalism in Montenegro.  I separate the general concept 
of nationalism into its constituent elements and examine 
them individually to create an overall picture of the state 
of nationalism in Montenegro.  In doing so I am able to 
determine if the conditions were ripe for nationalists to 
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mobilize people to declare independence for this reason.  
Next, I examine the impact of domestic material interests 
on the decision to remain united.  I determine who the 
relevant interest groups are and how much clout they wield 
in the politics of Serbia and Montenegro.  Lastly, I 
examine the role of the international community in the 
Balkans from 1990-1999.  In looking at the influence of 
external actors I will focus on two areas: who was involved 
and what balance of “sticks and carrots” did they use with 
Serbia and Montenegro. 
My primary sources include United States Congressional 
records, European Union decisions, United Nations 
resolutions, and speeches of major actors.  With regard to 
secondary sources, I relied on a variety of contemporary 
books on the Balkans, nongovernmental organization reports, 
internet articles, especially from the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service, as well as magazine and newspaper 
articles from the Former Yugoslavia. 
D. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 
On 29 November 1945, a newly elected constituent 
assembly announced the creation of the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  As a country of six republics, 
five nationalities, four languages, three religions, and 
two alphabets, Yugoslavia was supposed to represent the 
ability of disparate groups to work and live together in 
harmony.  Under the leadership of the charismatic Josip 
Broz Tito, Yugoslavia weathered many storms in relative 
peace.  Yet just a decade after his death, the cracks began 
to appear in the foundation of “brotherhood and unity” with 
chaos ensuing. 
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From 1991-1995 the country of Yugoslavia experienced a 
devastating civil war.  By the end of the war over 200,000 
people were killed, 2,000,000 civilians fled as refugees, 
and Europe experienced horrors such as concentration camps 
and mass executions on a scale not seen since 1945.1  The 
outcome of the conflict changed the face of the Balkans: 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia attained their 
goal of becoming independent states.  What was left of 
Yugoslavia consisted of only the largest of the former 
republics, Serbia, and the smallest and poorest, 
Montenegro.   The situation played itself out once more in 
1999 as the Yugoslav Army cracked down on the autonomous 
province of Kosovo.  Again, images of villages aflame and 
thousands of refugees filling the roads appeared in the 
news.  Only a fast response by NATO prevented a widening 
and worse conflict.  Unable to further brutalize Kosovo, 
Miloševic turned his attention towards Montenegro and 
rumors of a fifth Balkan war began to circulate. 
Miloševic’s primary opponent in Montenegro was the 
young leader from the Democratic Party of Socialists Milo 
Djukanovic.  Following bitterly contested elections in 
November 1997 where he defeated Miloševic’s close ally 
Momir Bulatovic, Djukanovic was inaugurated president of 
Montenegro in January 1998.  During the campaign, 
Djukanovic portrayed himself as “the champion of the 
republic in its struggle against Serbian domination and its 
effort to be integrated into Europe.”2  In 2000, in an 
                     
1 “The History Place: Genocide in the 20th Century,” 1999; available 
from http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/ bosnia.htm; 
Internet; accessed 15 March 2004. 
2 Report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
“Presidential Elections in Montenegro,” (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1998), 7. 
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effort to remain in power, Miloševic changed federal 
election regulations and voting procedures.  These changes 
permitted him to run for another term of office and enabled 
the president to be elected by a popular vote rather than 
by parliament.  Since Serbs greatly outnumber Montenegrins, 
a vote conducted in this manner was equivalent to certain 
victory for Miloševic at the ballot box.  This led to an 
increase in tension between the two republics, almost 
pushing Montenegro to hold an independence referendum.  
With the removal of Miloševic by a public uprising in 
October 2000, the international community pressured 
Djukanovic to temper his pro-independence stance with 
cooperation with the fledgling Serb democracy. 
However, in the years following Miloševic’s ouster, 
some Montenegrins became increasingly disenchanted with 
their link to Serbia.  Those favoring better relations with 
Europe and the world as whole saw Serbia as a barrier to 
reaching this objective.  Many believed the economies of 
Serbia and Montenegro were too dissimilar to make anything 
other than independence feasible.  Yet when it came time to 
dissolve Yugoslavia, the international community was 
present to ensure the two republics continued to remain 
connected, if only loosely. 
The first chapter of this thesis discusses the 
similarities and differences of Serbs and Montenegrins with 
respect to nationalism.  While there are enough differences 
between the two for a nationalist to make a case for a 
purely Montenegrin state, this did not happen.  The second 
chapter focuses on whether material interests of various 
actors would have been better served by an independent 
Montenegro or a continued union with Serbia.  The agreement 
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brokered between the two republics ensured that those 
interests were not affected.  The final chapter elaborates 
on the so-called “conventional wisdom” where the 
international community intervened to hold the two 
republics together.  Based on my research, the European 
Union was the primary actor in accomplishing this.  
However, Montenegro ensured that it preserved the ability 
for its citizens to determine their future by way of 
referendum in accordance with an agreed upon timeline.  The 
ultimate lesson learned is that the international community 
must be careful not to overestimate its ability to 
influence states especially where virulent nationalism may 
be present or where material interests are threatened by 
union or separation. 
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II. NATIONALISM  
This chapter will examine nationalism in Montenegro 
with regards to its decision to remain a part of Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s which ultimately led to the formation of 
Serbia and Montenegro.  In many regards, the two republics 
are the most similar of any in the former Yugoslavia.  
While Montenegrins are proud of their country and its 
history, I claim that there was no fanatical type of 
nationalism within it to lead it down the path of 
independence from Serbia. 
A. BACKGROUND 
One of the root causes of the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia lies in the nationalistic rhetoric of then 
Serbian President Slobodan Miloševic.  Under the premise of 
a “Greater Serbia,” he convinced the Serb minorities, 
specifically in Croatia and Bosnia, that their liberties 
would be threatened by a breakup of the republics.  The 
only way to preserve their rights would be to forcibly 
prevent the rogue states from becoming independent.  Thus 
began the Yugoslav Civil War. 
A series of vicious civil wars in modern day Europe’s 
backyard seemed to be an impossible occurrence, but many 
looked toward Montenegro as the next battlefield where 
Miloševic would assert his absolute power if the tiny 
republic declared its independence.  To understand why 
Montenegro chose the path it did, one must look at the 
sources of friction between the former republics. There 
have  been  countless  articles written about the causes of  
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Yugoslavia’s demise.  Yet it was the cry of nationalism 
which served as the source and proximate cause of the 
initial conflict. 
While the question of Montenegrin independence is an 
ongoing one, hateful, anti-Serb type nationalism will not 
play a major role in shaping its fate.  Understanding 
nationalism and the elements of which it is comprised is 
important in determining whether or not it will impact the 
people of Montenegro and if so, to what degree.  The 
constituent elements of nationalism that are of importance 
are “the consciousness of the population as unique or 
peculiar especially with respect to their ethnic, 
linguistic, or religious homogeneity, historical memories, 
and disrespect for and animosity towards other peoples.”3  
Political leaders in Montenegro, both in and out of office, 
have a significant role in this as well.  These individuals 
may decide to use nationalism as a means of energizing 
public support for independence.  The similarities between 
Serbs and Montenegrins, while certainly not identical, are 
close enough such that they will not serve as a divisive 
issue.  The current influential leaders in Montenegro are 
not disposed to use nationalism as a tool in asserting 
independence.  If Montenegro ultimately decides to become 
independent, nationalism is not likely to be one of its 
underlying reasons. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of nationalism growing in 
Montenegro was distinct as nationalism in the Balkans as a 
whole came to the world’s attention during the civil war.  
At that time “almost every one of Yugoslavia’s peoples 
                     
3 Peter Alter, Nationalism (Great Britain: Hodder Headline PLC, 
1994), 3. 
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[had] been perceived as a threat to another national group 
and [had] felt threatened itself.”4  With Tito’s death in 
1980, the fear of reprisals for non-cooperation no longer 
existed and tension between the republics was boiling over.  
The situation was ripe for the republics to declare their 
independence.  Montenegro could have succumbed to the 
nationalistic policies which were rampant elsewhere in the 
region and, perhaps, clash with Serbia itself. 
B. ETHNICITY 
Ethnic differences within the republics have often 
been cited as one of the primary sources of the Yugoslav 
conflict.  Indeed, one may see an inverse relationship 
between the level of ethnic homogeneity within a republic 
and the intensity of fighting which ensued there.  In 
Slovenia, where the fighting lasted a mere ten days, 
Slovenes consisted of 90% of the population and 98% of all 
Yugoslav Slovenes lived within its borders.  On the other 
hand, only 60% of all Serbs lived within Serbia proper.  In 
Croatia and Bosnia, Serb minorities consisted of 11.5% and 
32.2% of the population respectively.  Accordingly, the 
battles in Croatia were much more pointed than in Slovenia 
and even worse in Bosnia. 
The issue of ethnic differences between Serbs and 
Montenegrins, while present, is not a divisive one.  
Although not a point of contention, 62% of the population 
of Montenegro considers themselves to be Montenegrins and 
only 9.3% Serbians.  The issue becomes cloudier when people 
attempt to define what it means to be Montenegrin.  Some 
believe that they are both ethnicities with Serbian being 
the broader group of which Montenegrin is a subset.  These 
                     
4 Vesna Pesic, Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav 
Crisis (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 1. 
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pro-Serbian Montenegrins claim that Montenegrins are one 
tribe of the Serbian nation and have the same ethnogenesis 
and culture.  Professor William Dunn of the University of 
Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and International 
Affairs puts forth another take on this “same but 
different” view.  He says some Montenegrins see themselves 
as “high-caste Serbs, the warrior Serbs” and that “there’s 
a martial spirit there, and a sense of being separate 
that’s important in Montenegro.”5  Other anti-Serbian 
Montenegrins reject this outright even to go as far as 
saying they are “not Slavs at all but descend from 
originally non-Slavic stock, only accepting Serbo-Croatian 
as their indigenous language somewhat later.”6  These 
differences of opinion are not regionally oriented and can 
be seen within individual families.  The particularly 
infamous Serb nationalist Slobodan Miloševic is of 
Montenegrin descent.  His own brother Borislav considers 
himself Montenegrin.7  In any case, the ethnic relationship 
between Serbs and Montenegrins is the closest of all the 
former republics as finding a Slovene or Croat who 
considers themselves a Serb in the larger sense, for 
instance, would be challenging at the very least. 
C. LINGUISTICS 
Nationalism can also use linguistic differences to 
highlight the distinction between groups of people.  The 
three official languages of Yugoslavia were Serbo-Croatian, 
                     
5 John Christensen, “Montenegro: Hotspot in the making?,” 2001; 
available from http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/kosovo/stories/ 
region/montenegro; Internet; accessed 29 April 2005. 
6 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-
1991, 2d ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 212. 
7 Stojan Cerovic, Serbia and Montenegro: Reintegration, Divorce, or 
Something Else? (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 
2001), 6. 
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Slovenian, and Macedonian.  Following the break up, all the 
individual republics still speak one of these languages 
with the exception being that Serbo-Croatian is now defined 
as either Serbian or Croatian.  With its Latinic alphabet, 
Slovenian is closer to Croatian than it is to Serbian.  
Macedonian appears to be closer to Serbian and its Cyrillic 
alphabet.  In 1954, Serbian and Croatian linguists signed 
the Novi Sad Agreement which stated that the language of 
Serbs, Croats, and Montenegrins was in fact one language 
with two variants.8  The Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 even 
guaranteed that members of the minorities in Yugoslavia, 
such as Hungarians, Turks, and Romanians, could use the 
language and alphabet of its choice to include in public 
affairs and before government agencies.9 
While this article was widely respected by the 
government, some Yugoslavs attempted to use language to 
further define their specific ethnicity.  Serbs have long 
held 19th century author Vuk Karadžic in the highest 
literary regard.  It was Karadžic who “devised a spelling 
reform, formulated the first Serbian grammar, and published 
collected folk poems and tales.”10  Furthermore, Serbs 
believe that “by praising the national past and magnifying 
old glories through epics, he had great influence on the 
strengthening of national consciousness in the Serbian 
nation...Vuk Karadžic became the principal creator of 
                     
8 Robert Greenberg Gow, Language, and Nationalism and Serbian 
Politics (Washington, D.C.: East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson 
Center, 1999).  The Eastern variant used around Belgrade is either 
stokavian or ekavian.  The Western variant spoken around Zagreb is 
stokavian or ijekavian. 
9 Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, 
D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990). 
10 Vasa D. Mihailovich, Ph.D., “Yugoslav Literature,” in World 
Almanac Encyclopedia, 2005. 
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Serbian nationalism in the nineteenth century.”11  Textbooks 
urged children to “always only use pure Serbian words [by 
doing so] you also demonstrate that you are a patriot and 
that you love your national language.”12  Children were told 
that when the “foreigner and the enemy” refer to the 
language of Bosnians as Bosnian and that of Montenegrins as 
Montenegrin, they are speaking out against the creation of 
a Greater Serbia.  As Croats were shoring up their national 
identity by way of defining a unique Croatian tongue, Serb 
politicians and authors claimed “Croats did not have any 
literature except for Serbian literature” and that “seeing 
that they could not constitute a nation on the cakavian and 
kajkavian dialects (spoken in Croatia), Croats got the idea 
to take our language (Serbian).”13 
While the majority of Montenegrins openly recognize 
that they speak Serbian and not a separate language called 
Montenegrin, there is a vocal minority who claims 
otherwise.14  In order to establish their position, this 
minority accentuates some of the concrete differences 
between the language used in Serbia and that used in 
Montenegro.  The latter has three more letters than the 
thirty letters used in Serbian and Croatian.  Furthermore, 
a Montenegrin accent and dialect are clearly discernible 
when compared to that of a native Serb speaker.  Simply 
stated, though it may appear strange at face value, 
                     
11 Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav 
Union before 1914 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 
79. 
12 Ibid., 81. 
13 Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: Politics, Culture, and Religion in 
Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1992), 181. 
14 Cerovic, 6. 
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Montenegrins speak the Serbian language with a Croatian 
pronunciation. 
Dr. Radovan Rotkovic, a Montenegrin politician, fears 
that Serbian government officials are slowly trying to 
erase the distinctness of a Montenegrin language from use.  
A parliamentary debate in Montenegro in 1994 concerned the 
education laws for high schools.  Dr. Rotkovic noted that 
the law mentioned the “Serbian language,” but not the 
ijekavian dialect that is used in Montenegro.  He argued 
that this was not an oversight, but a deliberate attempt to 
denigrate the Montenegrin dialect.  As evidence he 
displayed a high school book cover with the Serbian title 
on it instead of the Montenegrin one and calling it 
“tantamount to impudence and political imperialism.”15  The 
issue of a separate Montenegrin language is an ongoing one.  
If Montenegro were to become independent, Montenegrin would 
almost certainly be the language of the new state.  
However, even in its union with Serbia, many influential 
Montenegrins are advocating a “Montenegrin linguistic 
secession.”16 
D. RELIGION 
The lack of religious homogeneity in the Former 
Yugoslavia gave nationalist leaders more leverage in 
agitating people already divided along ethnic lines.  While 
religion did not completely follow ethnicities, the 
majority of Slovenes and Croats were Catholic, Serbs were 
Eastern Orthodox, and Bosnian Muslims were Islam.  At times 
public officials practiced blatant religious favoritism 
                     
15 “In the Aftermath of Yugoslavia’s Collapse: The Politics of 
Language Death and Language Birth,” Fall 2001; available from 
http://www.unc.edu/courses/2001fall/slav/075/aftermath.htm; Internet; 
accessed 29 April 2005. 
16 Ibid. 
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within their jurisdictions.  Local leaders in Split, 
Croatia delayed building of an Orthodox church and 
politicians did likewise with construction of a mosque in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia.  In Serbia, spokesmen often 
characterized the struggles with Kosovar Albanians as one 
between Christianity and Islam.17  Leaders from all 
ethnicities blurred the lines between secular and spiritual 
to excite the call to nationalism. 
While significant religious differences do not exist 
between Serbians and Montenegrins, this is the area that 
has proved most susceptible to hostilities between the two 
peoples.  The two largest segments of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church in the Former Yugoslavia were the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, present since the Middle Ages, and Macedonian 
Orthodox Church, which divided from the Serbian Church in 
1967.18  During Montenegro’s period of independence, the 
Orthodox Church assumed the role of protector of the 
Montenegrin nation.19  At one point in time, Montenegrins 
had their own unique branch of the Serbian Orthodox Church.  
This branch dissolved when the Serbian Orthodox Church was 
pronounced the official church of Montenegro in 1922.20  In 
1993, by the will of Montenegrins, the church hierarchy was 
reconstituted as the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church 
(MAC).  Not surprisingly, confrontation with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church almost immediately ensured. 
The unrecognized Metropolitan bishop Miraš Dedaic 
established the MAC headquarters in Montenegro’s historic 
                     
17 Curtis, ed., 95. 
18 Ibid., 97. 
19 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 28. 
20 The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed., s.v. “Montenegro.” 
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capital of Cetinje.  The rivalry between the Serbian and 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church has peaked during periods of 
church festivals and holidays.  In these instances, they 
have challenged each other in “ritual and symbolic 
fashion.”  Occasionally, the two sides have resorted to 
using “traditional means such as fist-fighting and pistol-
shooting – thus far, only in the air.”21  The rhetoric of 
each side is also chillingly harsh.  An advocate of 
Montenegrin religious and state independence believes the 
MAC “will unify all Montenegrins around our native 
Montenegrin cults and saints in a single Montenegrin 
national state, instead of inciting hatred, turning us 
against our neighbors, and sending us to Heavenly Serbia.”22  
The Serb metropolitan, Amfilohije, who controlled the 
metropolitanate of Montenegro, said the Montenegrins were 
adopting a “tribal identity.”  When newly elected 
Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic called the MAC a 
symbol of distinct Montenegrin national identity and 
statehood, the Holy Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
condemned “the apostate Dedaic and his schismatic godless 
group backed by the separatists forces in Montenegro.”23 
These inter-Orthodox battles have clearly not come to an 
end as the Montenegrin metropolitan recently told his 
parishioners “I am convinced that we will celebrate the day 
of Christ’s resurrection next year in a free and 
independent Montenegro.”24 
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While Yugoslavs in other republics may have been on 
both ends of religious discrimination, Serbs and 
Montenegrins are largely homogeneous in their religious 
practice.  Today, 60% of Serbs and Montenegrins practice 
Eastern Orthodoxy.25  Nevertheless, the specific type of 
orthodoxy practiced remains important to some Montenegrins.  
While a large scale conflict is unlikely to erupt in Serbia 
and Montenegro solely because of religious differences, 
they could become divisive issues as part of a large move 
towards independence. 
E. HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES 
Another potentially divisive issue between Serbs and 
Montenegrins comes in the form of their historical 
differences.  Montenegrins have used the notion of a 
national writer to establish their national identity.  They 
have a history of being an independent state from 1878 to 
1918.   As the only Allied country to be annexed by another 
country at the end of World War I, Montenegrins fought 
Serbs outright from 1919 to 1926 in protest of this act.  
Nevertheless, most modern day Serbs and Montenegrins are 
not at odds over their less than perfect history. 
1.  The Story of Njegoš 
Petar Petrovic Njegoš is the best example of a 
Montenegrin national hero and yet this is still disputed by 
some Serbs.  It has been said of him that “Njegoš is 
Montenegro and Montenegro is Njegoš.”26  He is credited with 
being an outstanding poet and administrator of Montenegrin 
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affairs from 1830 to 1851.27  As a leader he increased the 
power of the central authority, opened Montenegro’s first 
schools, built its first roads, and fought back the 
Ottomans.28  More importantly, however, is the body of 
literary work he produced at the same time as these 
accomplishments.  His compositions contain many uses of 
local dialects and provincialisms, thus Montenegrins claim 
this as proof of a separate Montenegrin language.  While 
being from Montenegro, his work is pro-Serbian, and for 
that reason he is claimed by Serbs to be a writer for their 
people.   
Montenegrins appear to be torn between being proud of 
Njegoš for his impact on helping create a Montenegrin 
identity, and at the same time uncertain as to how to feel 
about the context in which Njegoš did this.  In his 
seminal, and controversial, work The Mountain Wreath, the 
purging of Turkish influence from Yugoslavia is implied by 
what would be called “ethnic cleansing” in today’s terms.  
In their efforts to achieve a national identity, 
Montenegrins are forced with redefining Njegoš such that 
they do not appear to condone those who use his works as 
propaganda in justifying such horrific acts.29  Serbian 
paramilitary leader Željko Ražnjatovic, otherwise known as 
Arkan, was an “admirer of Njegoš.  And it turns out that 
he’s not the only one whose heart begins to stir with black 
emotions at the reading of Njegoš’s description of ethnic 
cleansing as a bloody baptism leading to the rebirth of 
Serbia as the most powerful nation in the region.”30 
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In order to mitigate some of the negativity associated 
with Njegoš, Montenegrins have try to draw attention away 
from his specific message and focus more on general themes.  
For instance, one critic called Mountain Wreath “a hymn to 
freedom, a rejection of force and tyranny, a glorification 
of national and human ideals, the affirmation of moral 
ideas over brute desires.”31  Given the cruelty of the 
actual work, this “diversion” tactic seems to be the best 
one can do to deflect criticism.  Still others refer to 
other, less vicious, works of Njegoš to show a different 
side of him.  In a letter to Osman-Pasha of Skopje, a Serb 
convert to Islam, Njegoš said he “would like more than 
anything on earth to see accord between brothers in whom a 
single blood flows and who were nursed with the same 
milk.”32 
2. An Independent Past 
Montenegro is one of the only republics to have had 
its sovereignty recognized internationally before the 
creation of Yugoslavia.  It is possible that nationalistic 
leaders may use this fact to stir up patriotism to once 
again attain this standing.  Montenegrins have a reputation 
as “an unconquered race” and remember “to their everlasting 
credit that they not only remained free when the other Slav 
peoples as well as the Greek, Albanian, and Bulgar fell 
before the power of the Turk...they maintained their 
independence when all Europe, to the gates of Vienna, 
trembled before the hosts of the Crescent.”33  While it 
maintained status as an independent principality under the 
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Austro-Hungarian Empire, it was formally recognized as an 
independent state at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 by the 
Treaty of San Stefano.34  However, during World War I 
Austrian forces overran Montenegro and its king, Nicholas 
I, was forced to flee to Italy.  At about the same time, 
other South Slav leaders left for Italy and formed the 
“Yugoslav Committee.”  This group was dedicated to the 
union of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.  Nicholas I had 
obtained the title of king only in 1910 and strongly 
opposed joining a South Slav state which would naturally 
require the loss of his title.  Nevertheless, the Yugoslav 
Committee grew in power and influence and, through its 
representatives in Montenegro, obtained support for union 
effectively vetoing King Nicholas. 
The Montenegrins left behind fought bravely though and 
the Allies declared their unity with them.  British Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George promised the defeated nation 
that “the Allies will do justice to the heroism of the 
Montenegrins.”35  Regardless of this pledge of support, with 
Nicholas I ousted, the path was clear for King 
Karadjordjevic of Serbia to annex the now powerless 
Montenegro.36  By the end of 1918, the Njegoš Dynasty was 
deemed deposed and the Montenegrins allied with the Serbs.  
It  would  seem  that  the  Montenegrins were to be a Serb- 
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dominated power in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes which was recognized in the Paris Peace Conference 
of 1919.37 
3. The Christmas Uprising 
The Montenegrins would end up fighting the Serbs even 
before the conference in would be known as the Christmas 
Uprising.  This uprising later turned into a war resulting 
in casualties to the Montenegrins of approximately 3,000 
dead, 3,000 wounded, and thousands of homes destroyed.38  
Again, the Montenegrins were under the belief that the 
Allies would not tolerate the forceful and unwanted 
annexation and come to the aid of their cause.  When no 
help came, Montenegro was absorbed into the Kingdom and 
lost much of its identity to the larger Serbia.39  As part 
of the Serb-dominated government, Montenegro largely ceased 
to exist as a separate entity in any capacity.  
Montenegro’s status would remain unchanged until Tito came 
to power after World War II.  In 1946 it was established as 
one of the six republics of the newly formed Yugoslavia.  
Yet, in considering a balance-of-power type of scenario, 
some have suggested that “the creation of a Montenegrin 
republic, rather than the inclusion of Montenegro in 
Serbia, was intended to allay fears of Serbian hegemony in 
other republics.”40  There are Serbs who still feel strongly 
about this today and have used it to disparage the 
Montenegrin identity.  The significance of the Christmas 
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Uprising is that it highlights the fact that even between 
two republics similar in many respects, violence can occur 
with the revocation of power. 
F. XENOPHOBIA 
The final element in the structure of nationalism to 
be discussed is the presence of disrespect for and 
animosity towards other peoples.  Just prior to the 
fighting of the 1990s, this bitterness was palpable in the 
Balkans among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.  One of the 
most visible signs of the tension was the use of slanderous 
titles to describe the opposing republic’s nationalists in 
an effort to vilify them.  The Croats resorted to calling 
the Serbs “Cetniks” while the Serbs compared the Croats to 
“Ustaše.”  These terms are derived from the events of World 
War II under the occupying forces of Nazi Germany.  Colonel 
Draža Mihajlovic’s Cetniks, although enemies of the Nazis, 
were demonized by Tito’s partisans because of disagreements 
over how to counter the Nazi threat.  The Ustaše was the 
term used for the puppet Croatian government responsible 
for conversion, deportation, and extreme violence against 
Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies.  The level of violence even 
appalled the Germans.41  The reappearance of these terms 
during the Yugoslav Civil War demonstrates how leaders bent 
on nationalism energize the masses with disparaging 
oratory. 
Serbs and Montenegrins have never resorted to using 
slanderous rhetoric on each other to achieve their 
political aims.  While Montenegrins of the early 20th 
century were not agreeable to the annexation of their 
country, they did enjoy certain benefits as a republic.  
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Specifically, Montenegro, as the smallest and poorest 
republic, had equal rights with the other, more developed 
republics.  There were no serious problems with Serbia 
during the period of communist Yugoslavia.42  The 
relationship of Montenegro with Serbia during the Yugoslav 
Civil war was a precarious one.  While careful not to 
alienate themselves from Serbia, Montenegrins openly 
criticized Serb leaders for their conduct during the 1992-
1995 campaigns.  Additionally, they condemned Slobodan 
Miloševic specifically during the 1998-1999 purges against 
Kosovar Albanians.  The ruling coalition parties boycotted 
the September 2000 federal elections which ultimately led 
to the downfall of Miloševic’s regime.43  Thus it is 
apparent that even when the peoples of Montenegro do not 
agree with Serb acts, they are inclined to express their 
disapproval through political channels and not via 
inflammatory idioms or overt violence. 
G. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
In addition to the presence of these aforementioned 
elements in a state, a leader who is apt to use them as a 
means to an end is also necessary in invigorating the 
masses with nationalistic fervor.  There are three 
political leaders in Serbia and Montenegro who 
fundamentally impacted the relationship between those two 
republics:  Slobodan Miloševic, former President of Serbia 
then of Yugoslavia, Milo Djukanovic, Montenegrin President 
from 1998 to 2002, and his present day successor Filip 
Vujanovic.  These individuals have played key roles in the 
past history of Yugoslavia and, in the case of Vujanovic, 
Montenegro’s future. 
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The potential of Montenegro to become an independent 
state while under the shadow of Miloševic’s Yugoslavia were 
almost non-existent.  The precedent was set in 1987 when, 
after a staged episode of police brutality, Miloševic told 
the Serbian minority in Kosovo “[n]o one has the right to 
beat you.  No one will ever beat you again.”44  Soon after 
taking over as Yugoslav President, Miloševic revoked 
Kosovo’s status as an autonomous republic.  When Slovenia 
declared its independence in 1991, Miloševic mobilized the 
Yugoslav National Army to prevent them from breaking away.  
This episode repeated itself when Croatia and Bosnia 
declared their independence with much more bloody 
consequences.  In light of past republics’ experiences with 
desires for independence, there can be little doubt what 
would have happened to Montenegro if they too decided to 
break away from Yugoslavia. 
While never espousing the cause of Montenegrin 
nationalism, the presidency of Milo Djukanovic was seen as 
a threat to Serbia from its outset.  In fact, protestors 
from Belgrade attempted to disrupt his inauguration in 
January 1998.  Djukanovic failed to side with Serbia during 
the Kosovo conflict the following year which further 
increased tensions between the two states.  Miloševic 
openly voiced his displeasure with Djukanovic.45  
Nevertheless, Djukanovic never backed down and, although he 
risked incurring the wrath of Miloševic, continued to 
promise to the people of Montenegro a referendum on 
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independence.46  The most likely explanation of Djukanovic’s 
potentially inflammatory rhetoric is that he intended to 
use it “as a leverage against Miloševic in order to obtain 
a ‘redefinition of relations with FRY’, which in fact would 
mean the maintenance of a loose political affiliation with 
Belgrade and at the same time an opportunity to enact 
independent economic policies and qualify for western aid 
and investment.”47  Had Djukanovic advocated any form of 
violence in his gestures towards independence, he would 
have played into Miloševic’s hands by justifying the 
latter’s violent responded in kind. 
After Miloševic had been removed from power, 
Djukanovic’s biggest challenge was with the European Union.  
Officials from the EU urged Djukanovic to delay any move 
for independence under the pretext that it could cause 
strife within the state between those who support and those 
who oppose independence.  In actuality, the reason was 
based on the EU’s desire to avoid the issue of Kosovo’s 
autonomy.48  Finally, Djukanovic removed himself from 
directly having to confront the issue of Montenegrin 
independence by resigning as president in November 2002. 
Montenegro’s current president, Filip Vujanovic has 
shown no more tendencies towards utilizing nationalism in 
furthering his goals than his predecessor.  Although 
Vujanovic has been in office less than a year, he was 
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formerlly the Montenegrin Minister of Justice, Minister of 
Internal Affairs, and Prime Minister of Montenegro.  While 
serving as Prime Minister under Djukanovic, Vujanovic said 
“[i]f we don’t find a solution to coexist, we can certainly 
always ask the people’s opinion.”49  The day after being 
elected President of Montenegro he said that he would call 
for a referendum after three years to give Montenegrins “a 
chance to determine their country’s future.”50  It is plain 
to see from the tone of his remarks that while Vujanovic 
may want to further his citizens’ ability to declare 
independence, it is not under the auspices of nationalism. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence of the virulent form of nationalism is not 
present in Montenegro.  Montenegrin ties to Serbia 
ethnically, linguistically, and spiritually, while not 
completely homogenous, are more similar than dissimilar.  
The relationship between the two states since World War II, 
beginning with the Tito led Yugoslavia, has been relatively 
peaceful.  Montenegro did not get caught up in the drive 
for independence of the other Balkan republics in the 
1990s.  Finally, disrespect and animosity of Serbs towards 
Montenegrins and vice versa is not a factor in the sense 
where it will lead to nationalistic based conflict. 
Furthermore, the political leaders in Serbia and 
Montenegro have not resorted to using nationalistic zeal 
against each other.  The one political leader who truly 
repressed the will of Montenegrins is now at the 
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international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.  The most 
recent two Montenegrin presidents have pledged their 
commitment to letting the people of Montenegro decide their 
status democratically without inciting nationalism.  In 
sum, for these reasons nationalism within Montenegro will 
not be a causal factor in their decision for or against 
independence. 
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III. MATERIAL INTERESTS 
In this chapter I will examine the influence of the 
material interests of actors in Montenegro on their 
decision to remain unified with Serbia instead of spilt 
into two separate states.  I will focus on three issues in 
particular that concern Montenegrin material interests.  
First, I will determine if there was a desire to maintain 
an independent tariff and commercial policy or if 
Montenegrins honestly attempted to harmonize their policy 
with Serbia as the EU wanted.  Second, I will look at 
efforts made to control Montenegro’s borders and stem 
organized crime or see if there was a desire to participate 
in, or at least turn a blind eye towards, corruption.  
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I will examine how 
the potential windfalls of privatization affected the 
resolve of Montenegrins to conduct the process 
transparently or make under the table deals with 
prospective investors.  This chapter will demonstrate that 
because there was no true cost to the material interests of 
Montenegro’s politicians and business leaders, they were 
willing to form the union with Serbia.  In practice, it was 
literally business as usual as the major actors made was no 
sacrifice to comply with the European Union’s wishes.  
Consequently, the ability of external actors to influence 
Montenegro’s decision to remain unified may not be as 
strong as it appears at first glance. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The claim of seceding in the name of material 
interests would not be unprecedented in the Balkans.  The 
lack of economic consensus in the former Yugoslavia between 
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the wealthier northern sections and more planning oriented 
southern part was of particular concern to Slovenia and 
Croatia.  Prior to the disintegration, Slovenia was 
contributing a higher per capita share to federal funds 
than any other republic because its per capita income was 
the highest.  Croatia was earning more foreign currency 
than any other republic, yet by law, enterprises were able 
to retain only ten percent of this with the remainder 
deposited into the National Bank in Belgrade.51  Unable to 
secure approval for multi-party elections and a market-
oriented economy, the representatives of Slovenia and 
Croatia walked out of the last Congress of the Yugoslav 
Party in January 1990.52  Slovenia and Croatia had set the 
example for economic discontent as a motive to secede.  It 
is conceivable that Montenegrins could have also declared 
their independence for economic reasons, if it suited their 
material interests. 
From an economic perspective, the “union” of Serbia 
and Montenegro is not very unified at all.  There are two 
different currencies in use (the dinar in Serbia and the 
euro in Montenegro), two central banks, and separate 
customs systems.53  In an effort to bring these two 
disparate economies together, an Action Plan for 
harmonization was created.  This plan calls for Serbia to 
fund 95 percent of the joint federal institutions.  
However, Serbian and Montenegrin cooperation has not been 
forthcoming.  Serbia stated that they will only pay for the 
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joint army stationed on its territory.  This leaves 
Montenegro to cover the 26 million euro difference for the 
military on its soil including military pensioners.  
Officials in Montenegro have developed two creative 
solutions to this problem.  They have proposed downsizing 
the military staff from 7,000 to 3,000 and selling off 
portions of its military property.  Also, the Union navy 
protecting the coast is a shadow of its former self.  One 
report states that some large patrol ships have already 
been sold for 1.5 million euro and that the sale of 
submarines may be next.54  Steps such as these do not bode 
well for the future of an integrated economy. 
As will be elaborated upon in Chapter IV, the decision 
to transform Yugoslavia into a Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro instead of granting immediate independence for 
each state was largely the work of the European Union.  80 
percent of both Serbs and Montenegrins support this 
approach to Europe, but few believe their government is 
making progress in that direction.55  European Union 
officials have repeatedly said that neither Serbia nor 
Montenegro will be able to enter the union individually.  
Specifically, the concern is that Montenegro’s independence 
may touch off other independence movements in Kosovo, 
Macedonia, and even the Republic of Srpska in Bosnia 
plunging the region into another round of bloody conflict.  
The European Union’s two main focus areas for the Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro are cooperation with the 
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and harmonization of their different economies. 
Some accuse the European Union itself of sabotaging 
Serbia and Montenegro’s efforts to join their organization.  
Goran Svilanovic, Serbia and Montenegro’s foreign minister, 
claims that since Europe allowed his country to form with 
two banks and currencies, they can hardly criticize them 
for harmonizing too slowly.  In agreeing to what the 
European Union brokered, Serbia and Montenegro “are bearing 
the consequences of the decisions of [their] governments.”56  
Indeed, if the EU required immediate and complete economic 
union, the political union may not have materialized at 
all. 
B. TARIFFS AND COMMERCIAL POLICY 
One of the main problem areas between Serbia and 
Montenegro lies in harmonization of tariffs.  An internal 
border exists between Serbia and Montenegro which, though 
not known to many, is claimed to be “one of the tightest in 
the Balkans.”57  This border effectively stifles the flow of 
goods and services between Serbia and Montenegro.  A trader 
bringing his product into Serbia would pay one set of 
customs at its border, and another to take the same product 
into Montenegro.  Banks are also reluctant to accept 
transfers from one side of the union to the other.  Since 
Serbia and Montenegro have different sources for their 
income, each has its own concept of what the tariff 
structure for the Union should be. 
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The issue at hand involves normalizing 56 agricultural 
tariffs.  Serbia has long been the “bread basket” of the 
Balkans.  With their large agricultural sector, Serbs want 
high tariffs on foodstuffs to protect their domestic food 
producers.  On the other hand, Montenegro has a poorly 
developed agriculture and therefore wants low import taxes 
to obtain the best possible store prices for its citizens.58  
Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic felt so strongly 
about Serbia’s reluctance to lower the tariffs that he said 
“faced with this choice [of harmonization] and that of EU 
membership, we will choose to preserve our own 
agriculture.”  Voicing obvious displeasure with the EU, he 
added “we will not sign whatever Brussels serves up at any 
cost and with having to make such sacrifices...The rule-
with-an-iron-fist policy passed into history a long time 
ago.”59 
In contrast to Serbian desires to limit the number of 
people entering the union, Montenegro has an interest in 
promoting a “loose” visa policy.  Montenegrins rely on 
tourism and services for a bulk of their income.  Tourism 
accounts for about 15 percent of Montenegro’s GDP and an 
estimated 33 million euro is being invested in the industry 
this year.  By 2015, investments are projected to reach 84 
million euro or just over 20 percent of the total 
investments in the country.60  Consequently, it behooves 
Montenegro’s hoteliers to have as little bureaucracy as 
possible to entice tourists into spending their vacations, 
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and their hard currency, on the Montenegrin coast.  Yet 
Serbian politicians fear a loose visa regime will result in 
a flood of foreign workers, thus undermining the employment 
rate of Serbian citizens. 
Serbian and Montenegrin officials are well aware of 
the impact and importance of tariffs.  Montenegrin 
President Milo Djukanovic understands Serbia’s point of 
view.  He believes it is “impossible to expect Serbia to 
cut customs rates for 56 agricultural products, and destroy 
its agrarian industry, or Montenegro to raise those same 
tariffs and threaten the living standard of its citizens.”61  
The Governor of the National Bank of Serbia, Branko Hinic, 
sees another negative aspect to lower tariffs in Serbia.  
He explains that “the lower cost of imported products due 
to lower customs could have a positive impact on prices in 
general, but matters grow complicated in regard to the 
foreign trade deficit, since lower import prices are 
certainly conducive to import demands, and if there is a 
shortage in financing the trade deficit there will be 
pressure on the rate of exchange which will set the spiral 
shooting with the exchange rate pushing prices up.”62  
Despite much discussion, the two sides are still not close 
to reaching an agreement regarding the issue of 
harmonization. 
The actual harm that would come to Montenegro as a 
result of higher tariffs is disputed by economists.  Daniel 
Gros, economist and director of the Brussels-based Center 
                     
61 “Serbian Agency Views Ongoing ‘Reservations’ in Montenegro 
Regarding State Union,” 19 May 2004; Belgrade BETA Week; FBIS; accessed 
30 May 2004. 
62 “Central Bank Official Views Consequences of S-M Customs 
Harmonization on Serbia,” 16 June 2003; Belgrade Glas Javnosti; FBIS; 
accessed 14 May 2005. 
33 
for European Policy Studies, states that “harmonization of 
customs rates will have a direct impact on consumers in 
Montenegro to the amount of $45 million a year.”63  Serbia 
had requested Montenegro raise its tariffs on textiles to 
20 per cent.  This increase would cost the typical 
Montenegrin household an additional 150 euros, which is an 
average monthly salary.  Montenegrin Entrepreneurship 
Center Director Petar Ivanovic concurs with Gros and states 
that increasing tariffs means restricting economic freedom, 
leaving Montenegrins “to choose between expensive, 
unproductive and insufficiently beneficial domestic 
products, and expensive foreign commodities which are much 
more productive, but encumbered by customs.”64 
However, Milenko Popovic, director of the Montenegro 
University Institute for International Studies disagrees.  
While he believes an increase to the custom rates will 
cause losses to the Montenegrin economy, it will not be to 
the degree Gros predicts.  According to Popovic, the 
magnitude of the loss will “depend on the quantity of 
Serbian products covering Montenegro’s imports, and 
Montenegrin products and services replacing current 
imports.” Additionally, Montenegrin losses will be 
mitigated by “the possible dynamic effect of customs 
harmonization and access to Serbia’s comparatively large 
market for the export of Montenegrin products.”65  In fact, 
some studies have shown that the effects of harmonization 
on the Montenegrin economy were largely positive.  In 90 
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percent of the instances where customs rates were adjusted, 
retail prices did not increase.  The budget deficit also 
did not rise as some had forecasted.66  In light of this 
view of the effects of harmonization, Montenegrin 
politicians might not have stood to lose economically or 
politically by unifying with Serbia. 
Those who stand to lose the most from customs 
harmonization are the importers.  Popovic continues in 
saying that “losses from imminent harmonization will be 
suffered by the same people that profited from the imports, 
setting the prices higher than in Serbia.  These people 
have been major profiteers in the last three years [since 
2000], since the new trade regime was established in 
Montenegro.”67  Many people in the import lobby are in close 
connection with the government where some people earned 
their initial capital in less than transparent ways.  
Executive director of the non-governmental organization 
“Group for Changes,” Nebojša Medojevic, applauded 
Montenegro’s Minister for International Economic Relations 
and European Integration, Gordana Djurovic, as the first 
member of government to admit the import lobby exists, even 
though the deputy chairman of the Privatization Council, 
Veselin Vukotic, has always denied this.68 
Medojevic also believes that harmonization will 
threaten the industrial leaders and their monopolies in 
Montenegro.69  Harmonization is a long way off because “the 
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political elite [is] controlled by the financial oligarchs 
[and] does not want European standards in Montenegro.  They 
don’t want any changes.  Going to Europe means implementing 
reforms, which so far have been only theoretical and could 
jeopardize their ‘business’ interests.”70  This underlying 
problem is much more difficult to address than the overt 
tariff issue and significantly affects any motivation 
Montenegro’s economic and political leadership has in 
expediting harmonization. 
From the very beginning of the debate about the 
feasibility of a union, Serbs and Montenegrins have nearly 
unanimously agreed that it was impossible to harmonize 
tariffs and commercial policies.  They have continually 
stalled in complying with the EU’s wishes.  The European 
Union has recently shown a willingness to pursue a more 
realistic approach in dealing with Serbia and Montenegro.  
In adopting a “twin-track” approach, the EU has agreed to 
exclude from harmonization “customs tariffs, the signing of 
international agreements, foreign trade regime, and 
harmonization of taxes.”71  The effects of this reversal of 
position are two-fold.  First, it more accurately reflects 
the economic reality of the situation in the union.  
Second, the EU has effectively bought itself time by 
removing one of the most significant points of contention 
between Serbia and Montenegro. 
Despite making this concession, the EU remains 
insistent that the union not dissolve.  Javier Solana, the 
chief architect in forming the union, said “by launching a 
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more differentiated approach, the EU was recognizing 
differences on the ground without splitting up the 
country.”72  The EU Council of Ministers President and Dutch 
Foreign Minister Bernard Bot said “that this twin-track 
approach does not mean that the EU endeavors for preserving 
the SCG State Union have failed, but that the EU would 
continue to strongly support the State Union while 
accepting the reality of different economic systems in 
Serbia and Montenegro.”73  Thus, this decision has allowed 
the constituent republics to continue their trek towards EU 
membership as a single entity while still protecting their 
individual economic interests. 
C. BORDER CONTROL, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND CORRUPTION 
In order to best serve their material interests, 
Montenegrin government officials have to assume positive 
control of their borders from Serbia and carry out a 
careful balancing act with the European Union.  With border 
control in Montenegrin hands, it assures that any smuggler 
seeking safe passage will have to bribe Montenegrin, rather 
than Union, officials.  Simultaneously, in order to avoid 
being branded as a state that condones trafficking, 
authorities have to appear to be taking steps towards 
stamping out illegal activity.  Officials would not want to 
get too close to the EU, however, because that would 
increase EU scrutiny of Montenegro’s faux efforts.   For 
these reasons, Montenegrin politicians want to be free not 
only of its ties with Serbia, but also of European Union 
supervision. 
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On 31 December 2004, Montenegrin police assumed 
control over its 840 kilometer long border from the Army of 
Serbia and Montenegro.  The state border department, 
comprised of 1,450 employees of whom 600 are border 
policemen, is responsible for securing Montenegro’s 
borders.  A smaller contingent of naval officers, under the 
auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, is in charge of 
the 137 kilometer long marine border.  In a country with a 
population of roughly 650,000 where in 2004 five million 
people passed through, securing the borders is a major 
enterprise.74 
Montenegro has artfully financed this undertaking with 
as little cost to itself as necessary by relying heavily on 
foreign aid.  The United States has given a grant of four 
and a half million euros to cover the costs of training 
conducted by the US Department of Homeland Security and 
purchased equipment including four vessels, 30 all-terrain 
Fords, communications gear, and high-tech surveillance 
equipment.  A statement from the US consulate in Podgorica 
says “the goal of this assistance is to help Montenegro 
fight smuggling, trafficking, terrorism, and other cross-
border crime.”75  The European Agency for Reconstruction has 
donated 450,000 euros to buy equipment for detecting 
radioactivity, carbon dioxide levels in closed spaces, and 
passport reading devices.  Department personnel have also 
received training from experts from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
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Despite these concrete steps towards border control 
and reduction in crime levels, Montenegrin officials face 
an uphill battle in overcoming a checkered past.  
Montenegro has had a reputation as a transit country for 
contraband coming from Albania and Turkey destined for 
Western Europe and the United States.  In a public opinion 
poll conducted by the NGO Group for Changes, 53 percent of 
those polled believe that the present Montenegrin 
authorities are unable to fight crime and corruption with 
just over a quarter believing this to be possible.  Over 
two-thirds of the participants believe that organized crime 
exists in their republic, despite statements to the 
contrary by state attorney Vesna Medenica.76  Transparency 
International ranks Serbia and Montenegro in 97th place out 
of 145 countries measured according to their corruption 
perception index.  The only European country with a lower 
score was Albania.77 
There is ample reason for Montenegrin citizens to 
believe corruption is rampant in their society.  An 
anonymous Montenegrin Interior Ministry official said that 
the operational division does an excellent job of 
conducting ambushes and apprehending suspects but then “a 
person from the state leadership or the police leadership, 
especially the State Security Service, comes to hush up the 
case” in the name of catching the “bigger fish.”  Then, 
claims the source, when the police arrest some of the 
“prominent mafia bosses, who usually escort large shipments 
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of merchandise, we have to release them even before we get 
them to a police station.”78 
Most notably, some high profile officials have been 
implicated in various crimes.  In 2002, deputy state 
attorney Zoran Piperovic was arrested on charges of pimping 
and human trafficking.  While his arrest was an important 
first step in the fight against organized crime in 
Montenegro, it left no doubt that corruption can reach the 
highest levels of government.  In fact, Prime Minister Milo 
Djukanovic was at the center of a cigarette smuggling 
scandal for his alleged activities during the Yugoslav 
civil wars of the 1990s.  A former smuggler said that “the 
Montenegrin authorities benefited hugely...for a case with 
50 cigarette cartons [500 packets], we had to pay an import 
fee of $36.”79  Cigarette smuggling remains a large problem 
as 70 percent of all cigarettes bought in Montenegro are 
smuggled.80  At one point, there were four international 
investigations and a law suit against Djukanovic with the 
Italian government even issuing a warrant for his arrest.  
While he has not been convicted of any specific crime, the 
indictments themselves have not help improve the public’s 
opinion on corruption in government. 
Montenegro has attempted to alter this negative public 
perception.  In September 2003, legislation was passed that 
requires identification of all transactions over 15,000 
euros.  The US has also sponsored a conference entitled 
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“Techniques to Combat Money Laundering and Corruption” 
where a panel of distinguished international experts 
briefed Montenegrin judges, prosecutors, police, and 
members of the Financial Intelligence Unit.81  Nevertheless, 
it is likely that public opinion will only improve with 
quantifiable results.  A decline in the percentage of 
smuggled cigarettes in Montenegro, for example, would be an 
excellent demonstration of both the strength of 
Montenegro’s tighter borders and the weakness of influence 
by smugglers and criminals on government officials. 
D. THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION 
Finally, the privatization of property has been a slow 
and, at times, controversial process in Montenegro.  Thus 
far the European Union has been content to allow Montenegro 
to conduct its privatization process without interfering.  
This has been to the benefit of Montenegrin officials who 
oversee privatization.  At issue is the fate of some of the 
largest companies in the region.  Thus, the fight among 
interested parties can be huge because it may shape the 
distribution of wealth and power in society for the 
foreseeable future.  Montenegrin officials place great 
stock in the privatization of their companies to both 
improve them and consolidate where necessary.  Montenegrin 
Minister of Labor and Welfare Predrag Drecun pragmatically 
compares privatization to an x-ray.  “[Privatization] will 
examine the sick tissue of Montenegro’s economy.  A part of 
the ‘sick companies’ can be revitalized, while a part will 
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have to be amputated.’”82  Under Tito’s leadership, 
companies were “socially owned” and economic assets were 
“deemed to be owned by society generally, and managed by 
the employees and the local community.”83  Privatization 
technically began in 1989, but was only seriously 
undertaken in the 1995-1996 time frame. 
There is no supervisory agency at the Union level to 
oversee the transfer of property to private hands in Serbia 
and Montenegro.  Rather, each republic has its own separate 
organization for this task.  In Montenegro this is done by 
the Agency for Economic Restructuring and Foreign 
Investments.  In Serbia it is simply known as the Agency 
for Privatization and falls under the Ministry of Economy 
and Privatization.  This point is key to the future of the 
union because if such a joint agency existed, or was 
created, the beneficiaries of privatization would likely 
shift in favor of a unified state.  That is, those holding 
the reins of power over privatization in one specific 
republic could only legitimately do so with the approval of 
a union agency overseeing it.  In the current situation, 
each republic has had little conflict with the other over 
privatization matters in general. 
There are two methods of privatizing firms in 
Montenegro: vouchers and tenders.  With the exception of a 
handful of companies, most firms were offered for voucher 
privatization.  Under this system, Montenegrin citizens 
received a privatization voucher worth around 2000 euros.  
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They could then exchange their vouchers for shares at 
auctions.  This process was completed in March 2002.84  On 
the other hand, the tender method of privatization is 
designed to attract strategic, preferably foreign, 
investors.  It essentially involves the largest companies 
in the country.  As opposed to the voucher method, tenders 
have met with limited success in Montenegro.  The 
government’s 2003 privatization target was 70 million euros 
but achieved only 26.6 million euros.85 
The ability of those who control the Montenegrin state 
to control which enterprises are privatized and by which 
method is very lucrative.  In 2002, the estimated value of 
the 135 firms offered for voucher was about 692 million 
DEM.  Comparatively, the fourteen companies offered under 
the tender system had an estimated value of 2.2 billion 
DEM.  There were a further four companies for which a 
method had not been determined worth an estimated 3.8 
billion DEM.86  Thus it is clear that the bulk of highly 
valued companies, the “jewels in the crown,” have been 
taken off the table for those with vouchers and made 
available to international corporations through tender. 
The privatization of one of the fourteen by tender 
companies, the Aluminum Complex Podgorica (KAP), is causing 
great debate within Montenegro.  Outside of Russia, the 
largest reserves of bauxite in Europe, the raw material for 
aluminum, are believed to be in Montenegro.  KAP is a major 
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player in the Montenegrin economy.  According to government 
officials, it is responsible for 30 percent of Montenegro’s 
employment, “consumes 60 percent of Montenegro’s 
electricity output and is the largest customer of the 
republic’s railroads and of the seaport of Bar.  As a 
result, the plant accounts for more than half of 
Montenegro’s economy and foreign exchange earnings.”87  
Consequently, KAP is perhaps the finest jewel of those in 
the crown. 
The problem with KAP’s recent sale is that Montenegrin 
officials conducted it in a less than transparent manner.  
The decision was not made by the commission in charge of 
tenders or the government’s privatization agency, but by a 
direct agreement between Prime Minister Djukanovic and 
Russian Rusal owner, billionaire Oleg Deripaska.88  Former 
American ambassador Richard Sklar objected to this backroom 
deal and attempted to intervene prior to the sale eliciting 
an inflammatory Russian response.  Russian consul general 
in Podgorica Vladimir Vaniev sarcastically remarked that he 
wasn’t aware that Montenegro was the 51st state and that, 
if this is so, he had better inform his foreign minister 
right away.89  Despite this slight to Montenegro, the deal 
went through for an estimated $135 million in equity and 
investment.   
The apparent backroom deal has naturally caused an 
uproar by public watchdog groups.  The Socialist People’s                      
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Party deputy leader Dragisa Pesic claimed that “it is 
obvious that the deadline for the submitting of tenders was 
being put off so that the powerful Russian oligarch and the 
Montenegrin master would meet and reach an agreement in a 
café [and settle] the sale of over a half of Montenegro’s 
economic resources.”90  In a scathing critique of the 
Montenegrin government, the Group for Changes claimed that 
this only confirmed that “there is only a pyramid of power 
consisting of Djukanovic and his closest friends, 
organizations linked to [organized] crime, intellectuals 
who have sold themselves, non-governmental organizations, 
and the controlling media.  All that is an oligarchic 
capitalism that resembles feudalism and not modern 
capitalism.”91  The group’s leader Medojevic believes that 
“the prime minister is obviously looking for some ways 
leading to Moscow, because that will probably be his 
destination when he quits politics, since he seems to be 
having problems with the judicial authorities of some other 
states.  All this is just another confirmation that 
Djukanovic thinks of the citizens of Montenegro as his 
personal property.”92  The European Union has remained quiet 
about the controversial sale.  While their silence may not 
indicate consent to the deal, EU officials certainly have 
not taken any overt measures to ensure legitimacy in 
Montenegro’s privatization process. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, Montenegrins were able to satisfy their 
material interests without having to declare their 
independence thus satisfying themselves and the EU.  First, 
                     




despite initial attempts by the EU to force the 
harmonization of their economy with Serbia, Montenegrins 
were able to set tariffs and establish a commercial policy 
best suited for its citizens.  Since the majority of goods 
in the republic are imported rather than locally produced, 
the Montenegrin import lobby had an interest in convincing 
leaders in the government to maintain low tariffs.  
Likewise, businessmen involved in the tourist industry 
favored a visa regime structured to make it as painless as 
possible for foreigners to come to Montenegrin shores.  In 
the end, EU officials recognized the futility in trying to 
make the economic union work and changed Serbia and 
Montenegro’s economic independence from being de facto to 
de jure. 
Next, Montenegro has taken measures to gain control of 
its borders.  It is important to note that savvy 
Montenegrin officials have done so with generous amounts of 
foreign aid.  In addition, since corruption and illegal 
cross-border trade are still rampant in Montenegro, the net 
effect of this move only changes whose pockets are being 
lined.  Montenegrin citizens are convinced that corruption 
is present in their government and the actions of their 
leaders justify this belief. 
Finally, Serbia and Montenegro are in the process of 
privatizing their formerly socially owned companies 
according to laws created by their individual parliaments.  
As long as the status quo is maintained, with each republic 
controlling the disposition of its own firms, there is 
unlikely to be any inter-republic conflict.  Yet this is 
not to say there will be no controversy inside the borders 
of each republic.  The sales of the largest companies, 
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designed to attract strategic investment, have been lengthy 
and not entirely transparent.  Furthermore, the EU has 
taken a laissez-faire approach with union in this process. 
In sum, with regard to the material interests of 
importers, tourist related businesses, and government 
officials, it is business as usual in Montenegro.  These 
individuals have effectively been able to have all the 
economic benefits of independence from Serbia without 
having to formally declare it.  In reversing its position 
on mandating a joint economic policy, the EU has agreed to 
working with each republic individually rather than 
instigate an independence move by either of them.  Assuming 
the EU will not revert to its original position, the 
resulting situation has been to the satisfaction of all 
parties.  However, with economic matters now relegated to 
the republic level, the “union” of Serbia and Montenegro 
has become more of an administrative title than one 
indicating true accord. 
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IV. THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS  
This chapter will examine the role of external actors 
in the affairs of Serbia and Montenegro.  The parties most 
interested in their continued union are the European Union, 
the United Nations, and the United States.  Russia, 
however, has sent mixed signals to the Montenegrin 
government.  In some regards, Russia encourages Serbia and 
Montenegro to work together, but almost simultaneously has 
sought to build political and economic ties with them 
separately.  In any case, the notion of Slavic brotherhood, 
whereby Russia is presumed to have some special connection 
to the Serbs, is greatly exaggerated.  History has shown 
that realism and practicality have dominated their 
relationship more than any sentimental or historical urge 
to come to each other’s aid.  Russia’s influence on the 
union has been secondary to the other actors.  Montenegro’s 
interaction with the aforementioned external entities has 
already had an impact on its quest for independence and 
will continue to do so in the future.  I argue that were it 
not for the intervention of a number of international 
actors, the European Union in particular, Serbia and 
Montenegro would have separated into two distinct states.  
Officials in the European Union knew that they could use 
the “carrot” of membership as leverage in shaping 
Montenegrin views on the benefits of independence.  
However, there are limits as to the extent of the 
international community’s power to influence states.  
Montenegrin  leaders  were willing to work with the EU only  
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because they felt their ultimate aims of restoring 
Montenegro’s international status would not be compromised 
by doing so. 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. On the Path to Independence 
Following the NATO air war over Kosovo, Montenegro was 
very close to holding an independence referendum.  Polls at 
the time showed a full 70 percent of Montenegrins would 
support the move with half of that number consisting of 
“Montenegrinists” and the remainder ardent supporters of 
then President Djukanovic.93  Worth mentioning is that even 
twenty percent of those in the pro-Miloševic Socialist 
People’s Party believed that a referendum should have been 
held.  At the age of 35, Djukanovic won the 1997 
Montenegrin presidential elections on a pro-independence 
platform.  He consistently won subsequent elections holding 
similar views.  Following his victory, he visited many 
Western heads of state and other top officials to promote 
his vision of an independent state.  Understanding the 
international community would most likely not welcome 
another problem in the Balkans, Djukanovic was adamant that 
Montenegro’s independence would not destabilize the 
region.94  Stressing how strained relations had become 
between the two republics, legal scholar and pro-democracy 
advocate Srdjan Darmanovic claimed “Montenegro does not 
recognize the federal government at all.  We have taken as 
much autonomy as we can and still legally be part of the 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”95  While this may be an 
exaggeration, it is only a slight one.  Thus based on the 
rhetoric and actions of Djukanovic, Montenegro was clearly 
heading towards independence. 
2. Pre and Post-Miloševic Montenegro 
However, Montenegro’s outlook on independence changed 
with the fall of Miloševic in October 2000.  Prior to this, 
Montenegrin politicians were having increasingly 
confrontational relations with the government in Belgrade 
leaving little doubt that they could secede without a 
conflict under Miloševic’s dictatorial rule.  Djukanovic 
stated that in the event of hostilities brought about by 
Miloševic, “we will have no other choice but to defend our 
state and our freedom.”96  In an interview with The New York 
Times, Djukanovic claimed that a Yugoslav special military 
police battalion with troops loyal to Miloševic was 
actually created in Podgorica to try to force him from 
power.97  The height of these tensions occurred in July 2000 
when Miloševic “amended the federal constitution allowing 
him to run for re-election and changing the regulation so 
that the Federal president is elected by popular ballot 
rather than in the Parliament.”98  This virtually assured 
Miloševic of victory as Serbs outnumber Montenegrins 
roughly sixteen to one.  Miloševic was seeking to turn the 
largely ceremonial position of Yugoslav president into one 
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of more authority.  Montenegro, fearing a stronger federal 
president could more readily intervene in republic affairs, 
responded at once by declaring a suspension of federal 
decisions.  Completely exhausted with being an 
international pariah, the people of Serbia rioted when 
Miloševic attempted to steal the election of autumn 2000 
from opposition leader Vojislav Kostunica.  This led to the 
easing of tensions between the two republics when Miloševic 
was extradited to The Hague in June 2001. 
Although at first it may seem contradictory, a post-
Miloševic regime was not entirely beneficial for 
Montenegrins desiring independence.  Under Miloševic, 
Montenegro could count on a degree of sympathy and perhaps 
cooperation from the international community in its quest 
for independence.  As one pro-independence Montenegrin 
wisely said shortly before the controversial 2000 
elections, “I’ve never supported [Miloševic] more, because 
if Miloševic wins, we’ll definitely have independence 
here.”99  With Miloševic removed from power, the attitude of 
most foreign governments leaned towards pressing Montenegro 
to cooperate with Serbia’s democratic reforms rather than 
focus on separating from it.  This served as an additional 
hurdle for Montenegro to overcome in attaining independent 
statehood. 
3. The New Constitution 
From December 2001 to March 2002, the international 
community focused on diplomatic efforts to preserve some 
form of union between the last two remnants of Yugoslavia.  
These efforts culminated on March 14, 2002 when the 
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
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Federal Deputy Prime Minister, the President of the 
Republic of Montenegro, and the prime ministers of Serbia 
and Montenegro signed the historic Belgrade Agreement.  
Another significant individual present was the official 
witness of the signing, European Union High Representative 
for Foreign Policy and Security, Javier Solana.  This 
agreement effectively dissolved the country of Yugoslavia 
on February 4, 2003 when it was approved by the individual 
assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro.  The agreement 
establishes the federal institutions as the Assembly, the 
President, the Council of Ministers, and the Court.100  In 
some regards the two states are unitary in name only, most 
notably with respect to their economy and customs laws as 
discussed in Chapter III.  The central government in 
Belgrade is ostensibly in charge of defense and foreign 
affairs, but Montenegro has tried to strike new ground with 
the latter.  While largely unsuccessful, Montenegrin 
politicians have attempted to reach out to the West with 
hopes of forging bilateral relations separate from Serbia.  
For example, rather than providing unconditional support, 
Secretary of State Albright cautioned Montenegrin Prime 
Minister Vujanovic against a hasty declaration of 
independence during a four-day visit to the US.101 
Two of the more important articles of the agreement 
concern the issues of independence and the structure of the 
military.  The earliest that either constituency can hold a 
referendum for independence is 2006.  If this occurs, 
international documents concerning the Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia, particularly UN Security Council Resolution 
1244, “would relate in their entirety to Serbia as 
successor.”102  This ensures the fate of Kosovo is not left 
undetermined if a split should happen.  Under Tito’s 
regime, conscripts served outside their native republic 
under the presumption that they would more readily put down 
uprisings against other ethnicities than their own.  
However, under the new union, recruits complete their 
mandatory military service in their native member-state, 
but may serve in the other member-state if so desired.  
This leaves the possibility of each state’s security forces 
being used against each other in the event of inter-
republic hostilities.  These two constitutional articles 
demonstrate the shift away from Tito’s tightly controlled 
Yugoslavia where, until 1974, the federal state dominated 
the republics as well as the perverted version offered by 
Miloševic where Serbia alone held that position. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The most influential outside entity in the 
relationship between Serbia and Montenegro has been, and 
most likely will continue to be, the European Union.  
Montenegro has viewed its possible future as an independent 
state inextricably tied to EU recognition.  Montenegrin 
President Filip Vujanovic said that the “way to European 
integration is the interest of all the people of 
Montenegro, interest of all the parties, governing and 
opposition...”103  Serbian politicians, on the other hand, 
have not always put as much interest in joining the EU as 
Montenegro.  Yugoslav Premier Momir Bulatovic once said 
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that he was proud to be on an EU blacklist which barred him 
and hundreds of other Miloševic loyalists from entering any 
member countries.  He boasted “we are all proud to be on 
the list, which is the proof that we remained faithful to 
our goals, interests, obligations and the need to defend 
our country” and that “getting off the list would be easy, 
you just need to say that Slobodan Miloševic is not right 
and that America is right.”104 
The European Union has most recently asserted itself 
in the affairs of the Former Yugoslavia with the admission 
of Slovenia on 1 May 2004 and accepting Croatia as a 
candidate country on 18 June 2004.  Javier Solana has 
clearly and repeatedly stated that the road to joining the 
European Union lies in Serbia and Montenegro’s continued 
unity, though his role in helping create the Belgrade 
Agreement was somewhat controversial because of his 
previous positions.  As one Serbian politician noted “it 
[is] cynical that the man who ordered the bombing of 
Yugoslavia¼as the then Secretary General of NATO should be 
assisting the talks process now.”105  Still others who 
believe he held too prominent a role in the negotiations 
derisively call the new union of Serbia and Montenegro 
“Solania.”  The issue of how long the members of the union 
would have to wait until holding an independence referendum 
proved to be one of the complex items of the compromise.  
Solana initially proposed a moratorium on such a referendum 
for five, six, or even seven years.  Naturally this was 
ill-received by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic 
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who wanted it much sooner.  The negotiating parties reached 
a compromise of three years which began counting down when 
the new constitution came into effect.106 
There is no apparent dissension within the EU ranks on 
its firm position on Serbia and Montenegro.  Then French 
Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine said that “no European or 
American leader, as far as I know, is in favour of 
Montenegro possibly becoming independent, and I don’t 
believe, what’s more, that there are any neighboring 
countries who are in favour of it either.”107  In a visit to 
Belgrade, French President Jacques Chirac bluntly said that 
“the European Union opposes the idea of an independent 
Montenegro.  The Union is now hostile towards a total 
severance of relations between Montenegro and the federal 
state.”108  Likewise, Germany, who was largely responsible 
for leading the international community in recognizing an 
independent Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, urged Montenegro 
to give democratic reforms in Serbia a chance.  In a 
meeting with President Djukanovic, German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer flatly said that his country would not 
support “Podgorica’s plan to achieve quick sovereignty.”109 
The European Union’s major apprehension with 
Montenegro’s declaration of independence is that it will 
create further instability in the region.  Of specific 
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concern are independence-minded Albanians in Kosovo, as 
well as in Macedonia, and Serbs from the former warring 
factions within Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Almost a quarter 
million ethnic Albanian refugees fled to Macedonia during 
Operation Allied Force in 1999 and its sizable Albanian 
minority already there may more actively seek a union with 
Albania proper if Serbia is the lone successor to 
Yugoslavia.  Finally, the still delicate peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina may be shattered if the Bosnian Serbs 
desire political unity with an individually sovereign 
Serbia.  In sum, the EU has legitimate reason to worry that 
an independent Montenegro could result in upsetting the 
uneasy calm throughout the Balkans. 
To a certain extent, the European Union is intervening 
in the domestic policy of a sovereign state.  Solana 
justifies this as “further fragmentation would only create 
further division and instability in Montenegro and the 
region.”110  He also warned Montenegro that in declaring 
independence they would effectively lose all gains made to 
date by the combined efforts of both states.  One other 
method Solana is using to decrease the chance of 
Montenegrins passing a successful independence referendum 
is by requiring its support by a qualified majority rather 
than a simple majority.111  In this endeavor he has the 
backing of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), Europe’s preeminent elections watchdog.  
Finally, despite all the efforts of the European Union to 
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keep the two countries together, even their own officials 
admit that if “after a democratic process Montenegro 
becomes independent, [they] will reluctantly accept 
this.”112 
Montenegro did not accept the Belgrade Agreement 
without believing they would receive something in return 
from the European Union.  Their agreed upon delay in 
holding an independence referendum was supposed to be in 
exchange for more rapid progress towards membership.  
However, the European Commission has only recently 
completed a feasibility study on Serbia and Montenegro’s 
preparedness for entry which is the first important step in 
the process.  EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn 
stated that “this is the beginning of the European road for 
Serbia and Montenegro.”  The study concluded that the union 
is sufficiently prepared to negotiate a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA).  The SAA, the final stage of 
the Stabilization and Association Process, creates “a 
contractual relation between a country of the [Western 
Balkan] region and the European Union.”113  The timing of 
the announcement may be more than coincidence.  Serbia and 
Montenegro’s prospects for EU membership have improved 
considerably with less than a year before the first 
available opportunity to hold an independence referendum.   
While the EU holds considerable sway in the Balkans, 
Montenegrin officials have stated there are some matters 
                     
112 “Montenegro accuses EU of bias against small countries,” 9 
February 2002; Europe Information Service No. 2658; accessed 10 May 
2004. 
113 “Serbia and Montenegro: Commission confirms sufficient progress 
to open negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement,” 12 
April 2005; available from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/; Internet; 
accessed 26 May 2005. 
57 
that are non-negotiable.  During an interview with an 
Italian newspaper, Djukanovic was asked if there was 
anything in Montenegro’s negotiations with the EU that he 
could never accept.  The prime minister was clear in his 
response by saying:  
What we could never accept in any way whatsoever 
are limitations on our right to choose our 
future.  We would consider that discrimination.  
If Europe disagrees, let it call a meeting of the 
Council for General Affairs and state explicitly 
that Montenegro cannot do it; but I think certain 
rights are indisputable.114 
Following the signing of the Belgrade Agreement, 
Djukanovic faced the wrath of his pro-independence 
constituency who accused him of betraying his election 
promises.  During a question and answer session, he 
vehemently denied this accusation claiming “my election 
promise was to pursue a policy conducive to the restoration 
of Montenegrin statehood...I still believe that this is the 
best solution for the present and the future of 
Montenegro.”  Later in the session he reiterated that his 
preoccupation was “not with the [independence] referendum, 
but with the restoration of Montenegrin statehood, and with 
Montenegro regaining its international and legal status.”115 
C. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ICTY 
Firmly linked to Montenegro’s status in Europe and the 
world is its relationship with the United Nations.  Prior 
to the fall of Miloševic, Montenegro, in an attempt to 
increase its diplomatic visibility and gain Western 
support, sent Zeljko Perovic to establish himself as a                      
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self-proclaimed one-man “head of mission and U.N. liaison 
officer.”116  Yet, since it was a constituent republic of 
Yugoslavia at the time, Montenegro could not even receive 
“observer” status similar to that granted to entities like 
the Palestine Liberation Organization.  In fact, not even 
the envoys from Belgrade had full rights at the UN as some 
membership rights were revoked with the outbreak of civil 
war in 1992.117  While a worthy attempt, the Montenegrin 
move proved to be an ineffective means of championing their 
cause. 
Montenegro has a special interest in maintaining good 
relations with the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).  Established by Security 
Council Resolution 827 on May 25, 1993, the ICTY has 
focused its efforts on prosecuting all those guilty of 
committing war crimes regardless of ethnicity.118  Serbia 
and Montenegro are constantly reminded that their admission 
to the European Union depends greatly on their compliance 
with the ICTY.  According to European Union External 
Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, “[l]et’s be clear, 
Serbia can protect those indicted for mass murder and other 
horrible crimes or it can join the European Union, but it 
can’t do both.”119 
Montenegro has two distinct approaches in its 
relations with the ICTY.  The first involves collaboration 
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with Serbia in amending a controversial constitutional law.  
After its ratification in 2002, the offending law, “Article 
39,” held that any person indicted for war crimes after the 
law came into effect could not be extradited to The Hague.  
There was an immediate international outcry when the 
article was passed.  Judge Claude Jorda, President of the 
ICTY, said Article 39 “contravenes international 
obligations.”  The European Commission had characterized 
Serbia and Montenegro’s cooperation with the ICTY as “slow, 
reluctant, and insufficient.”  Serbia and Montenegro 
responded to this criticism by amending the law.  The 
amendment strips away the time limitation clause so that 
further indictments are permitted.  Serbia and Montenegro’s 
foreign minister Goran Svilanovic acknowledged that new 
indictments can be expected with the passing of the 
amendment.  This amendment has won praise from the 
Coalition for International Justice in showing “renewed 
willingness to cooperate with The Hague.”120 
Unfortunately, the move towards compliance has not 
always been steady and uniform.  In March 2004, the United 
States withheld $26 million in economic aid to Serbia and 
Montenegro because of Serbia’s lack of compliance with the 
ICTY.  Thus Montenegro’s second tack involves distancing 
itself from Serbia and its associated image as an 
international outcast.  The Montenegrin government is 
actively working with the ICTY independent of Serbia.   
Former Montenegrin Foreign Minister Dragiša Burzan pledged 
his country’s full cooperation with the ICTY calling it “a 
civilization matter for us.”  He also vehemently denies the 
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presence of any indictees on Montenegrin soil.121  President 
Vujanovic was even more specific stating “Karadžic [who was 
born there] would never enter Montenegro because he knows 
he would be arrested immediately.”  Vujanovic called the 
allegations that he is hiding there “lies...presented to 
make the international community less interested in 
cooperation with Montenegro.”122  Montenegro is aware of the 
link between working with the ICTY and its rapprochement 
with Europe.  Although Serbia has worked with The Hague in 
an inconsistent fashion, Montenegro is much more anxious to 
cooperate in order to further the legitimacy of their 
international aims. 
D. THE UNITED STATES 
The position of the United States towards Serbia and 
Montenegro virtually mirrors that of the European Union and 
United Nations.  The US feels strongly that Serbia and 
Montenegro should remain together.  In July 1999, when 
asked by the editor of a Montenegrin weekly if the US would 
block a Montenegrin move towards independence if forced to 
leave Yugoslavia because of Miloševic, President Clinton 
said “I want the people of Montenegro to have a maximum of 
freedom and self-determination.  But I don’t think it’s a 
good idea for the United States, or for Western Europe 
generally, to get in the business of redrawing national 
borders right now.”123  US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, William 
Montgomery,  said  that  “the United States fully supported  
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the views of the EU regarding the future relations of 
Montenegro and Serbia...there is no longer any dilemma 
about it.”124 
The United States has taken something of a political 
“tough love” approach with Montenegro.  As with the EU, the 
US is insistent on the union’s full cooperation with The 
Hague and is critical of Belgrade’s “arms-to-Iraq” scandal 
in 2002.  While Miloševic was in power, the US had to give 
its support to Djukanovic to help undermine the dictator’s 
power base, but not so much so as to give the appearance of 
backing Montenegrin independence.  US-Yugoslav relations 
reached their lowest point in 1999 when Richard Holbrooke 
sought Yugoslavia’s removal from the United Nations.  Yet 
even after Miloševic’s fall, it was challenging for 
Montenegrin authorities to receive Western acknowledgement.  
One month after the Bush administration took office, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell refused to see Djukanovic 
when he was in Washington, D.C.125  The State Department 
claimed that Powell did not want to influence the impending 
elections in Montenegro. 
Montenegro also has to consider America’s clout even 
with regard to EU accession.  Croatia recently admitted 
that its “cooling relations” with the US were 
“instrumental...in the postponement of [membership] 
negotiations with the European Union.”126  The road to the 
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EU may not lead through Washington, but US support is 
understood to be an unstated prerequisite for countries 
seeking EU membership. 
The United States continues to be an important actor 
in the region for economic reasons.  America was Serbia and 
Montenegro’s largest foreign investor in 2003.127  On 
another level, the United States holds sway with the other 
potential sources of external aid.  If they can convince 
these foreign actors that aid to Serbia and Montenegro is 
inadvisable, they very well may stop their assistance 
efforts.  This move would devastate Serbia and Montenegro’s 
already fragile economy.  Serbian Deputy Prime Minister 
Miroljub Labus put it succinctly: “Serbia cannot do without 
the IMF.”128  While the threat of foreign aid drying up is 
serious enough, there may be even graver impacts.  As a 
consequence of the withdrawal of foreign aid, investors may 
interpret this as a sign of regional instability and lack 
of international commitment.  The likelihood of investment 
in this type of scenario is very low. Clearly, the United 
States’ influence over Serbia and Montenegro is substantial 
both politically and economically. 
E. RUSSIA  
Not all of the actors who can influence Serbia and 
Montenegro are from the West.  There is a perception that 
Russia has historic ties to Serbia and they will always 
come to the aid of their “Slavic brothers.”  In fact, 
Russia only supports the Serbian cause when it is to their 
benefit and, historically, “when push comes to shove Russia 
                     
127 “External Affairs, Serbia and Montenegro,” 17 March 2004; 
available from http://www4.janes.com; Internet; accessed 14 May 2004. 
128 “Labus Says Serbia Ready To Pursue Reforms, Optimistic on Debt, 
IMF,” 12 April 2004; Novi Sad Dnevnik; FBIS; accessed 30 May 2004. 
63 
has always abandoned the ‘savages.’”129  In recent times, 
Russia has sent conflicting messages regarding the 
relationship between Serbia and Montenegro.  Russia began 
with ambivalent statements.  They said that the matter was 
purely a domestic one and “[w]hether Serbia and Montenegro 
become independent states or stay in a single federation, 
Russia is prepared in any event to cooperate closely with 
both republics.”130 
The next development occurred in April 2003 when 
Russia decided to withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from 
Kosovo and Bosnia. The two reasons given by Russian Chief 
of General Staff Anatolii Kvashnin were that all of their 
military objectives had been achieved and the high 
operating costs of the deployments.  In reality, there is 
still unrest there which requires an international military 
presence and the total operational expense is relatively 
small.  The more likely reason is a lack of Russia’s 
interest in the Balkans stemming from the discernment that 
they cannot compete with the West there.131  Serbian 
President Boris Tadic could only say that, “we did not 
fully understand this decision, but we respected it.”132  
Russian officials added that the drifting of Kosovo towards 
independence will lead to “a second Chechnya, where 
terrorism and drug trafficking will flourish...in the 
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center of Europe.”133   Fortunately this grim prediction has 
not come to pass.  Nevertheless, the decision to leave 
effectively relinquishes Russia’s ability to have a say in 
the region with regard to military matters.  Later in the 
same month of making this decision, in a reversal of 
statements made two years prior, a spokesman for the 
Russian Foreign Ministry said their country backed “the 
efforts of Belgrade and Podgorica to build up a Serbian-
Montenegrin state commonwealth.”134  However, this somewhat 
unclear stance of Russia’s true role in the region has not 
deterred Serbia and Montenegro from seeking its support. 
Serbia and Montenegro has looked to Russia for both 
political and economic assistance.  During the 
aforementioned crisis in 2000 when Miloševic adopted 
fundamental constitutional amendments without consulting 
Montenegrin officials, the Serbian leader was hoping 
Montenegro would actually attempt to hold an independence 
referendum.  This would have given him justification in 
declaring martial law and the ability to deploy the 
Yugoslav army against Montenegro.  Djukanovic believed the 
Balkans were facing another civil war “which only Russia 
could prevent.”135  Yet at this critical hour Russia did not 
intervene.  Economically, Serbia and Montenegro are 
dependent on Russia for energy sources such as natural gas.  
Serbia in particular has a critical need for natural gas to 
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improve its economy and, at one point, had a $300 million 
debt to Russia’s gas industry joint-stock company 
Gazprom.136  Gas shipments were actually suspended in June 
2000 due to Serbia’s arrears and projected inability to 
pay.  Finally, as discussed in Chapter III, many businesses 
and industries in Montenegro have yet to be privatized 
which make them ripe for foreign investors.  Russia has 
already poured capital into Montenegro by purchasing hotels 
on the Adriatic and real estate connected to tourism.137  
While Russia may not hold a dominant position in 
determining the future of the union between Serbia and 
Montenegro, the two republics continue to have interests 
there.  Therefore, in the search for European Union 
membership, Serbia and Montenegro have to find a balance 
between embracing the West while being careful not to 
alienate Russia. 
F. CONCLUSIONS 
Under the leadership of Djukanovic in the late 1990’s, 
Montenegro seemed to be destined for independence. Yet, it 
was the EU that brokered the peaceful transition from 
Yugoslavia into the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.  
Djukanovic placed greater value on becoming an EU member 
state than on any other goal, even independence.  Without 
EU involvement, Montenegro would have likely declared its 
independence regardless of the consequences outside its 
borders.  Yet, Djukanovic did not perceive the signing of 
the signing of the Belgrade Agreement as a true sacrifice 
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of autonomy.  He said that “objectively and responsibly, we 
can say today that with this [agreement] Montenegro has 
retained and affirmed all important rights for governing 
its own future.”138  Furthermore, it is important to note 
that Montenegro did not give carte blanc to the EU in 
setting the conditions for the new union with Serbia.  
Djukanovic was insistent that his citizens ultimately be 
afforded the opportunity to determine their future.  If the 
EU had not specified a timeline allowing for a referendum 
to be held, Montenegro would not have signed the agreement. 
Besides the European Union, there are other external 
actors which influenced Montenegro’s behavior.  In order to 
gain international acceptance, Montenegro had to closely 
cooperate with the ICTY.  Additionally, with potential 
investment interests in Montenegro and the power of 
granting or withholding critical foreign aid, the United 
States also holds considerable influence in the 
international community.  Thus far the US has been willing 
to defer to the European Union in matters concerning 
Montenegro and will almost certainly continue to do so in 
the future.  Finally, while Russia may be seen as an 
alternative to the West, it has demonstrated little 
interest in the Union’s affairs and, consequently, holds 
negligible influence over its behavior. 
                     




A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The Union of Serbia and Montenegro is a case of 
successful international intervention to prevent another 
possible Balkan war.  Left to their own devices, 
Montenegro’s leaders would have held an independence 
referendum most likely in the 1999-2000 timeframe.  With 
Miloševic still in power, this could have resulted in 
bloodshed.  In successfully negotiating a union of the two 
republics, the international community avoided the outbreak 
of hostilities within Montenegro as well as potentially in 
its neighboring states.  However, the union of Serbia and 
Montenegro is virtually a misnomer as the only truly 
federal institutions are the Foreign Ministry and military. 
In general, Montenegrin nationalism has not been a 
factor in the decision to separate or unify with Serbia.  
Ethnically, linguistically, and religiously, Serbia and 
Montenegro are quite similar, but certainly not identical.  
Each republic also has a distinct history which has not 
always been marked by cordial relations.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the prominent leaders of Montenegro have not 
been prone to utilizing nationalism to further their goals.  
Yet, there are enough differences between the two republics 
that someone determined to stir up support for a 
“Montenegrin identity” could conceivably do so. 
Another important factor in this case was that 
Montenegrins were able to satiate their material interests 
and still remain together with Serbia.  Relying on an 
economy that survives on imports, low tariffs benefit all 
but a small minority of Montenegrins.  Montenegro’s 
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political leaders were able to maintain control over this 
policy independent of Serbia.  Furthermore, Montenegro has 
assumed control of its borders, but has not demonstrated 
the will to curb the tide of smugglers and organized 
criminals transiting through the country.  This indicates 
that these illegal groups are likely now paying off 
Montenegrin border officials rather than Yugoslav Army 
ones.  Lastly, the current methods of privatization in 
Montenegro allow elites to receive all the potential 
benefits of the process without submitting themselves to 
higher echelon oversight.  European Union officials or a 
strong federal government in Belgrade could have asserted 
themselves as a clearing house for privatization matters in 
the union thereby undercutting Montenegro’s authority.  Yet 
current trends in the relationship between the EU and 
Montenegro indicate that the former is willing to give much 
more autonomy to the later in return for continued union 
with Serbia.  If the EU attempted to force the economies 
together in such a way that imposed a cost on the 
Montenegrin elite, the true extent of EU influence would 
have been brought to light. 
At first sight, it appears that the international 
community overcame Montenegro’s momentum towards 
independence and successfully negotiated a union with 
Serbia.  While it is a fact that the endstate consisted of 
no independent Montenegro and, more importantly, no 
regional hostilities, external actors did not have to 
contend with two potentially divisive factors.  First,   
the world did not have to convince nationalistic 
Montenegrins to halt their desire for a sovereign state.  
Second, the EU agreed to allow the two states to have 
69 
essentially independent economies without affecting their 
material interests.  Consequently, there was no cost 
imposed on politicians or business leaders who had 
interests in being able to set or influence Montenegrin 
fiscal policies.  Furthermore, Montenegro agreed to this 
union with the understanding that it could hold an 
independence referendum as early as February 2006.  As that 
time draws nearer, the EU has made additional concessions 
which further loosened the already loose union.  The United 
States has essentially backed the EU’s work and has used 
its monetary strength to promote Montenegro’s cooperation 
with the UN and ICTY.  Finally, the Russian Federation has 
taken an approach resulting in a decline of its influence 
in the region and is not a factor in the independence 
question.  In short, Montenegrins are willing to be joined 
with Serbia as long as the fire of nationalism does not 
flare up and the phantom union does not impinge on 
Montenegrin elites’ material interests. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The failure of the international community to prevent 
the tragedies in Bosnia and Kosovo did not deter it from 
intervening in Montenegro.  However, this is not to say 
that it has found the “silver bullet” for making all 
potentially sovereign states abandon their independence 
aims.  As has been shown, the conditions in Montenegro were 
conducive to international negotiations.  The scenario 
could have concluded much differently if the world had to 
force two (or more) entities together without leaving room 
for compromise. 
The term “independence” has a different meaning when 
mentioned in the context of the Balkans.  While the 
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anniversary of the United States’ independence makes most 
Americans feel proud, Croatia and Bosnia’s struggle for 
independence brings forth thoughts of mass suffering and 
shameful international indifference.  The specter of the 
Yugoslav civil wars still weighs heavy on the minds of 
today’s diplomats.  For this reason, they react cautiously 
when minorities make statements concerning independence.  
The conditions surrounding independence in the Balkans 
today are much different than those of the early 1990’s.  
Montenegro’s future is intertwined with the question of 
minority rights in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Bosnia as their 
status poses the greatest threat to regional security.  In 
confronting a situation similar to that in the Former 
Yugoslavia, international actors would be well-advised to 
consider what elements of nationalism are present and the 
presence of individuals willing to use them as well as 
whose material interests are affected by the continuance of 
union.  This will allow the world to form the best course 
of action for that specific situation – to do otherwise 
could be disasterous. 
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